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Age of Anxiety
Reflections on the Present State of Australian History
Nicholas Brown
I. A ‘self-referential’ pursuit?
The final chapter in the recently published, two-volume Cambridge History of Australia is titled 
‘The History Anxiety’, and was written by Mark McKenna, whose biography of Australia’s perhaps 
most eminent – or at least identifiable – historian, Manning Clark, won the Prime Minister’s 
Prize for Non-Fiction (and many other awards) in 2011. The chapter offers both a survey of the 
political trauma that has surrounded history as a discipline in Australia over recent years, but is itself 
a symptom of the problem underpinning that trauma. In concluding such a major collaborative 
project, McKenna’s views have considerable authority in speaking for the historical profession in 
Australia. His perspective, reviewers have noted, is of a discipline ‘less certain’, ‘multifarious, many-
layered and open-ended’, and grappling both with its own recent political entanglements, and with 
‘mighty changes’ in all areas, from ‘the research process’ to its place in a wider culture of historical 
reflection.(1) In this, the dilemma McKenna discusses has particular Australian elements, but also 
connects to a wider contemporary questioning of the place of history in universities, nations and 
the media.
As a survey, McKenna’s chapter deals with the search for legitimacy that has always been 
implicit in the settler-colonial history of Australia, and with the unsettled ways in which that 
history has been quarried for an elusive ‘foundational narrative’.(2) Whether in dealing with 
the dispossession of indigenous people, accounting for the enduring imprint and adaptation 
of essentially British state authority, or evoking a sense of identity to contain a sustained and 
largely unprecedented program of increasingly culturally-diverse immigration, history has had 
a particularly prominent role in articulating a sense of the Australian nation. The near celebrity 
status Manning Clark himself achieved in the 1970s and 1980s was evidence of this role, but 
also of the controversy it could generate. As Prime Minister (1991-96), Paul Keating echoed 
Clark’s call for Australia’s to end their ‘groveling’ and ‘boot-licking’ deference to the ‘old world’ 
and embrace the promise of the ‘new’. History, in Australian political culture, has long been a 
(1)  Australian, Weekend Review, 23-24 November 2013, p.16.
(2)  Mark McKenna, ‘The History Anxiety’ in Alison Bashford and Stuart Macintrye, eds., The Cambridge History of Australia, 
Vol.2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p.571.
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primary site in which alternative interpretations, and justifications, of the nation are generated. 
Whether in labour, feminist, environmental or several other agenda of political reform, it is 
history in Australia which has been particularly prominent in framing the issues and informing 
the arguments.
As a symptom, McKenna’s chapter reflects the corresponding role that history has itself 
been accorded, and internalized: a status as a kind of public conscience and affirmation, of 
needing to reach out to ‘the people’. The anxiety McKenna identified was not just a matter 
of the debates into which historical perspectives have been drawn, but of the intersection 
between disciplinary practice – what makes for good history? – and its public role or calling. 
Part of history’s anxiety, as McKenna sees it, arises from the extent to which a turn to more 
critical, politically and theoretically informed scholarship from the 1960s onwards had the 
effect of distancing historians from a general readership, of locking them into ‘a myriad of 
specialist pursuits, each with its own self-referential terminology’.(3) It is worth reflecting on 
this positioning, not peculiar to Australia but pronounced within its culture. No other specific 
field or academic discipline, certainly no other defined area of humanities or social science 
practice, has so defined its educational or research profile in such terms. No other field has been 
so valorized in a Prime Minister’s prize for stepping beyond such ‘pursuits’ to reach the nation 
(in 2012 a more specific category of ‘Australian History’ was added to the list of such awards). 
And no other discipline is as prone to an ‘anxiety’ arising from a sense of failure to achieve that 
untroubled, uncritical public acceptance. 
As both a survey and a symptom, then, McKenna’s chapter is a good place to begin 
reflections on the current state of Australian history, particularly in the context of three 
inter-related themes. First, the ‘history wars’ waged in Australia from the late 1990s over the 
ideological content prevailing in the history taught in schools and universities, presented in 
museums and informing social commentary. Second, the objectives of a ‘national curriculum’ 
which might strike a better balance, in terms of content but also (and equally importantly) in 
correcting for a form of ‘democratic deficit’ identified among Australian citizens regarding their 
understanding of their society and its institutions. And, third, an historical scholarship seeking 
to adapt to these and other pressures associated with the ways in which history was being ‘used’ 
in contemporary Australia. Again, these elements have distinctive Australian dimensions, but 
they are not peculiar to Australia. Whether in the role of a textbook culture, the thresholds set 
in examination systems, the commodification of history in a range of media and institutional 
networks, the disenfranchisement of a generation who do not connect with historical identities 
or choices, or who connect with them in terms that fall outside the discipline’s comfort zones– 
history is in trouble, needing not so much a defence as a make-over.
This paper cannot cover all issues arising in these areas. Already, in the discussion arising 
from the forum, reproduced in this journal, there are a range of alternative perspectives, most 
(3)  McKenna, ‘History Anxiety’, p.573.
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particularly Professor Fujikawa’s contention that the dynamic of public history – inclusive, 
representative, empowering – has most to offer in this make-over. Professors Fujikawa and 
McKenna both share a concern about the ways in which history has been corrupted by its 
academic practitioners. My focus here is on two, rather different complementary questions: 
1. What is it about contemporary Australia that has produced these debates over the role 
of history?
2. What do these debates suggest about the questions being asked of history as a discipline, 
and in education, that might warrant more general reflection?
In posing these questions, my central argument is that Australia’s ‘history anxiety’ is both 
a product of political circumstances exerting pressures on (and creating opportunities for) the 
discipline, and a condition generated by historians’ perception of their public role. A wider, 
including a Japanese perspective, on this argument, would be valuable in (again) at least two 
ways:
1. In identifying areas in which Australian history has a new or continuing interest or 
significance beyond these preoccupations with its public role within Australia.
2. In identifying those aspects of ‘anxiety’ in historical practice that are not particular to 
Australia, but might benefit from being seen in broader intellectual, academic, cultural or 
political frameworks.
Some aspects of there frameworks can be seen in one of the central policy documents to emerge 
for Australia over recent years. The Gillard Government’s 2002 White Paper, Australia in the 
Asian Century, was built on the imperative of a more comprehensive engagement with the 
Asian region, not only in trade and services, but in cultural exchange and underlying values. The 
incoming Abbott government might already have archived the report from its official website as 
merely a ‘useful reference’, but its underlying emphasis on ‘soft power’ continues to characterize 
policy paradigms.(4) Not for the first time, Asian engagement sets some of the central terms in 
which aspects of Australian identity are being articulated.
II. The History Wars
There are several readily identifiable flash-points in accounting for the outbreak of the ‘History 
Wars’ in Australia.(5) One was a speech made by John Howard, leader of the Liberal Party, in 
(4)  ‘Asian Century Plans Consigned to History’, Australian, 28 October 2013.
(5)  By ‘History Wars’ I mean the intense public debate, not confined to Australia, over the political uses made of historical 
interpretations, and the perception that distinct political interests were being advanced through the public, educational and 
research engagement of historians with current social issues.
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his successful campaign to win national government from Keating’s Labor Party in 1996. ‘One 
of the more insidious developments of Australian political life’, Howard argued, ‘has been the 
attempt to rewrite Australian history in the service of a partisan political debate’.
Howard’s immediate target was the extent to which Keating was seen to have gone too far 
in suggesting – or demanding – that Australians rethink traditional views of their nation and its 
identity. Keating had urged Australians to embrace a wide-ranging agenda for reform in which 
historically-informed ideas of identity, allegiance and protection needed to be replaced. As his 
speech writer – himself an historian – Don Watson, explains, ‘Keating believed that the last 
symbols of Australia’s colonial past were inimical to a clear-eyed appreciation of reality’. That 
reality, towards the end of the twentieth century, included the need to deregulate industry and 
labour, embrace global competition in trade, seek points of intersection with the social, political 
and economic transformation of Asia, acknowledge the enduring impacts of colonization on 
Aboriginal peoples, move to republican government, and much else.(6) Keating spoke in terms of 
changing Australia’s present ‘narrative’, and grasped that to do so required changing perceptions 
of the past as well as those of the present and the future. Howard – aware of widely-felt 
discomfort at the pace of such reform, of the extent to which Keating was seen to be ‘dictatorial’ 
in pushing the pace of change, and being himself a master of ‘values’-based populism – seized 
on this anxiety. He anchored it powerfully in the contrast between a nation being told it should 
be ashamed of its past (‘the black arm band view’ or ‘guilt industry’ were phrases coined by 
influential conservative historian, Geoffrey Blainey, to describe this interpretation) and one 
encouraged to take pride in its achievements, and appreciate the strength drawn from a shared 
heritage amid uncertainty. 
Such a contrast in styles of leadership, and in framing agendas, was only effective as a 
political gambit if history already had considerable, and recognized. status in articulating 
understandings of the nation. History, clearly, was worth fighting over. Again, it is difficult to 
imagine such a debate being waged in any other area of humanities and social science enquiry, 
and in which the framework of debate was not so much empirical fact (although this was 
drawn into contention), but the interpretation to be put upon it. Equally, it was not a contrast 
essentially about history at all. It was about politics, and the search for political legitimacy.
It is important to note that the ‘history wars’ did not erupt into a previously placid world: 
the Keating-Howard contrast had deep, almost tribal roots in Australian culture: Irish Catholic-
British Protestant; republican-monarchist – and so on. Nor can it be reduced to the struggle 
of political leadership. The connection between ideas of nation and the practice of history are 
familiar enough, both as a general proposition (such as the interdependence between models 
of fact-centred, progress-focussed ‘scientific history’ and modern state formation) and as a 
series of variations on a theme. It was remarkable – or not so remarkable – how quickly this 
debate descended into issues of professional integrity among historians which, as we will see, 
(6)  Don Watson, Reflections of a Bleeding Hear, North Sydney: Vintage, 2011, p.123.
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considerably narrowed its terms. Stefan Berger has observed that nations dealing with a range 
of literate or non-literate traditions and memories, dominant racial and religious cultures, or 
contested constitutional claims arising from colonial legacies, tend to develop national historical 
narratives and associated historical techniques to suit their purposes – and the process becomes 
mutually reinforcing.(7) The international phenomenon of late twentieth century history wars 
needs to be seen from the perspective of these national variations, and Australia is no exception 
to it.(8) What was being transacted through the history wars was in part an industrial dispute 
over what defined the criteria of valid intellectual work – a question which extended not simply 
to an assessment of the eminent historians engaged in the conflict, but implicitly to the quality 
of the educational and imaginative experience they could offer to others. It is regrettable that 
this second aspect figured so scantly in the Australian discussion – but refreshing that it emerged 
so centrally in discussions at the Osaka forum.
And from this perspective, it is significant that Australia was characterized by a relatively short, 
largely nineteenth century period during which a ‘glorifying’ narrative of the nation prevailed 
before it was challenged by more critically-attuned historiographies of labour, party-political 
competition, racial destiny and social experimentation. What McKenna, retrospectively, sees as 
an insularity arising from a turn to political theory among ‘new left’ historians, can equally be 
seen as a continuity with that earlier historiography, developing through the inter-war years not 
as a coherent program among professional historians so much as field of new questions about 
the Australian ‘social laboratory’ posed with reference to historical themes. The questioning 
of power structures and institutions, of the limits of citizenship and welfare policy, among 
younger Australian historians of the 1970s onwards, had – even if characterised by a good deal 
of ideological and generational sparring, and professionalisation within a rapidly expanding 
university system  – a sense of that inheritance, and its value: history as a radical – literally - 
discipline.(9) A changing of the guard occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century, then 
again sometime after the 1960s, but with – arguably – a relatively smooth transition into courses, 
textbooks, readings lists, public debate, and institutional consolidation. What, then, was so 
different about the ‘history wars’ of the 1990s? And why do theoretically informed perspectives 
become such a source of anxiety in the 2000s?
First, there is the political context already sketched: the intersection of ‘values’ politics and 
what Australian social commentators have also termed ‘the big angst’ of redefinition in social 
roles, economic expectations and political allegiance among ‘ordinary’ Australians from the 
1980s onwards. This ‘angst’ translated down to the most personal levels of insecurity, in work, 
relationships, roles and identity  – and has been perpetuated in a confessional media culture 
(7)  Stefan Berger, Introduction in Berger, ed., Writing the Nation: A Global Perspective, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
(8)  See Tony Taylor and Robert Guyver, eds., History Wars and the Classroom, Charlotte, North Carolina: Information Age 
Publishing, 2012.
(9)  Mark Hearn, ‘Writing the Nation in Australia’ in Berger, ed., Writing the Nation, pp.104, 115.
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(and a system of diminishing welfare security) that translates into the same terms.(10) That history 
was drawn into this angst was a product of the ways in which Australians experienced, and were 
encouraged to experience, this next iteration in their ‘social laboratory’, as the certainties of the 
past gave way to challenges of the future. A quick example: in 1988, amid a politically charged 
debate over the extent to which Australia’s immigration intake was being ‘Asianised’, the Hawke 
Labor government commissioned a Committee to Advise on Australia’s Immigration Policies. 
Carefully setting aside multiculturalism as a policy objective, the committee’s report offered as a 
core formulation that Australia was defined by an ‘innocence’ to be contrasted to the countries 
many immigrants left, and should leave behind in thought and deed. That ‘innocence’ was 
contrasted to countries which had ‘social systems … we would find unacceptable and, in some 
cases, repugnant’. This was a striking, and early, characterization of an essential polarity between 
a pure Australian historical inheritance (the ‘we’), and the ‘repugnant’ tangle of histories 
elsewhere. It would prove a resilient formulation. Part of the power of the debate over history 
was that it translated so directly into personalized, simplified states – ‘innocence’ – that bore 
very little relation to the more complex commonalities of class, race, gender, region etc in which 
the new social history, from the 1960s onwards, had began to encourage people to reflect on 
their sense of themselves.
Second, there is the local impact of that phenomenon identified by Jay Winter: the 
turn through the twentieth century to the ‘cult of memory’ – the processes by which people, 
especially in relatively affluent Western societies began to stake claims over, or to consume, 
history in similarly more personalized acts of investment, identification or ‘belonging’.(11) This is 
exactly what Professor Fujikawa reflects on as the commodification of history. John Howard’s 
appropriation of Australia’s ANZAC legend, and the boosting of visitations at the site of the 
1915 landing of Australian troops at Gallipoli, are a striking illustration of this trend – and 
perhaps of the extent to which Australians, perennially concerned by their distance from the 
centres of ‘real’, European or ‘big’ history, were vulnerable to such patterns of consumption. In a 
society so preoccupied by history as ‘proving’ the nation, as confirmed the past ‘we’ share rather 
than ‘they’ bequeathed, ‘ego-history’ – history as direct ‘heritage and accessible ‘memory’ – has 
deeply shaped historical culture.
Third is a broader concern about citizenship, a product of the earlier 1990s, which saw 
a Labor-government appointed ‘Civic Experts Group’ assemble ‘disturbing evidence’ of the 
extent to which ‘many Australians lack the knowledge and confidence to exercise their civic 
role’.(12) The challenge of overcoming this apparent lack of capacity to engage with community 
and political life was, revealingly, to be addressed primarily through an historically-informed 
(10)  Hugh Mackay, Reinventing Australia: The Mind and Mood of Australia in the 1990s, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1993, p.6.
(11)   Jay Winter, Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006, p.38.
(12)  Civics Expert Group, Whereas the People …: Civics and Citizenship Education, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1994, p.3.
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regime of information, facts and tests that would better anchor citizens in their society. Rather 
than focus – as civics education in Australia once had – on building relationships at local levels, 
and with reference to local factors (the family, the school, the community, etc), civics became 
a matter of a more abstract, generalized literacy: what did citizens need to know to become 
reliable members of society? This focus evolved, perhaps ironically given the Experts Group’s 
concerns with critical citizenship, to the questions on historical general knowledge that were 
posed in the Australian Citizenship Test, introduced by the Howard government in 2006 and 
readily characterized as being pre-occupied with concepts of heritage rather than rights.(13) 
Among other civic programs introduced by the Howard government was one requiring the 
daily flying of an Australian flag.
Without dismissing the specific, and often bitter, destructive politics with which the 
History Wars were fought in Australia, it is worth noting these influences on, and preconditions 
to, the battle. There was nothing new to contesting ideas of the nation through history in the 
1990s. What was new were the ways in which history as a discipline, a form of knowledge 
and identity, was made central to these highly personalized performances of citizenship, these 
places of ‘anxiety’. Equally significant is the extent to which historians were, if not complicit 
in, at least drawn in to, a parallel line of defence. Entering into the campaign against them – 
that, as Howard put it, historians had allowed their desire to advocate for ‘issues’ to push aside 
their first obligation to convey ‘exactly what happened’ – historians mostly adopted positions 
relating to the empirical verifiability of their interpretations. They insisted that their accounts 
were based on careful, reflective readings of the evidence, if not always strict reliance on hard 
facts, on the framing of hypotheses and new questions, and the exercise of considered empathy 
in drawing conclusions. But as Tony Birch has argued, such a ‘preoccupation with the integrity 
and authority of the discipline’ might be judged a ‘tactical failure’ when the real issues at stake 
were about the use of history in defining precisely these new areas of personalised politics.(14) 
Why did historians opt for this defence? In part, it was a symptom of that anxiety 
identified by McKenna: that the relevance of the discipline – even in educational contexts – 
resided essentially in a capacity to maintain an uncomplicated, unmediated connection to the 
people. But what other discipline – geography? literature? mathematics? sociology? – would 
so unquestioning place this responsibility on itself without first being clear about the specific 
contexts in which that responsibility was to be exercised: in classrooms, in lecture theatres, 
in public debate, in curatorial advice, in scholarship, etc? A central question to be asked in 
any campaign is: why choose to defend that particular patch of ground? The absence of a 
defence of the educational, let alone the scholarly (in contrast to the public) role of history in 
(13)   One sample question in this test reads: ‘What do we remember on Anzac Day? a) the landing of the First Fleet at Sydney 
Cove; b) the arrival of free settlers from Great Britain; c) the landing of the Australia and New Zealand Arny Corps at 
Gallipoli, Turkey’.
(14)  Tony Birch, ‘The Trouble With History’ in Paul Ashton and Alison Clark, eds., Australian History Now, 
Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2013, p.239.
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Australia’s history wars is striking. To adopt such a defence would not be to simply retreat into 
‘the academy’, but to reflect on what it means to encourage practices of historical thinking.
In a collection of essays published earlier this month, Australian History Now, several authors 
offer a different perspective on these questions. As editors, Anna Clark and Paul Aston concur 
with McKenna that Australian history is now characterized by ‘unresolved, anxious public 
debates’. They are, however, more prepared than McKenna to allow that the ‘democratisation of 
the discipline’ has been at the cost of developing the capacity for sustained questioning that was at 
the core of the theoretically-driven infusions – ‘the critical cultural practices of poststructuralism 
and postmodernism’ – from the 1970s onwards.(15) At least, these influences made politics, and 
a questioning of the basis and use of knowledge, central to historical thinking. And if they 
highlighted the contingent in historical interpretation, they also made the concepts of the 
‘collective’, the ‘social’, even ‘the nation’ itself, matters to be interrogated rather than assumed. 
As Alan Atkinson argues in the same collection, ‘history writing has become less concerned with 
[the] questions of possession and emotional attachment’ to the past that were interrogated from 
such perspectives, and ‘more with using the past as a field for imagination and entertainment’ 
on the premise that it should be readily accessible, easily shared and consumed.(16) I always return 
to the formulation offered by the American educationalist, Sam Wineberg, who argues that the 
excitement of historical study for students is not so much to confirm the familiar, as if the past 
was readily accessible, but to explore the unfamiliar, in an engagement with the past that is an 
inherently ‘unnatural act’.(17)
There is no doubt that the ferocity of the History Wars forced many into entrenched 
positions. The Howard government came into office with a clear intention to narrow the 
compass of political debate from the ‘big picture’ to a ‘small target’ of areas in which it could 
drive a ‘wedge’ into discussion and highlight political differences. It was supported by a range 
of think-tank and media outlets which exerted considerable influence. It was equally clear that 
Howard’s victory galvanized those opposed to his positions to think in terms of a major battle 
for causes which seemed under concerted assault – most prominently Indigenous recognition 
and reconciliation, minority social rights, redistributive social policy and tolerance of cultural 
diversity. The leading critic of the Howard ‘white-wash’, Stuart Macintyre, conceded that 
the style of one of his major interventions into the debate was deliberately ‘adversarial’, with 
the intention of stimulating debate (and also impact for his publisher).(18) But the stakes were 
undeniably high: in questions of influence over government research funding, in shaping the 
terms of public awareness, in reputations. Perhaps the major, and certainly the most symbolic, 
of the casualties was the National Museum of Australia, which had the misfortune to open in 
(15)   Paul Ashton and Alison Clark, Introduction, in Ashton and Clark, eds., Australian History Now, pp.14, 19, 20, 21. 
(16)  Alan Atkinson, ‘History in the Academy’ in Ashton and Clark, eds., Australian History Now, p.116.
(17)  Sam Wineberg, Historical Thinking and Other Unnatural Acts, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001, pp.3-
24.
(18)  Tony Taylor, ‘Under Siege from Right and Left’ in Taylor and Guyver, eds., History Wars, p.26.
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Canberra, after a long, sometimes controversial gestation, in a defiantly postmodern building 
in 2001, at the height of the conflict. 
Conceived in 1975 as a social history museum which would address the natural and human 
history of the continent, and ‘mend intellectual rifts’ relating to Aboriginal Australians and the 
impacts of settlement, the NMA built its first exhibitions around a reflective, sometimes openly 
deconstructionist engagement with the themes of ‘Land, Nation and People’.(19) The Howard 
government was unimpressed with exhibits that aimed to historicize rather than celebrate 
central images in Australian history, such as ‘the Digger’: the iconic soldier figure of World War 
One. It commissioned a review to ascertain ‘whether the Government’s vision in approving 
funding for [its] development … had been realised’, and scoured deep into captions, selections, 
curatorial style and intent. The NMA was chastened in enduring ways for ‘ridiculing’ national 
myths, and made a caution to other national cultural institutions.(20) It is significant that it 
would in time rebadge its mission as ‘Where Our Stories Live’, in an attempt to assure visitors 
that they would not be challenged so much as included, and affirmed, in its galleries. This shift 
is one enduring understated but profound consequence of the History Wars. 
III. The National Curriculum
Inevitably, the next campaign in the History Wars was in the classroom. In 2006 Howard 
announced the commencement of a school curriculum consultation and design process that 
would correct for a ‘postmodern culture of relativism, where any objective record of achievement 
is questioned or repudiated’.(21) A series of discussions, including not always representative groups 
of academic historians, education specialists and secondary level teachers, agreed on framing a 
discrete syllabus for Australian history, to be introduced across the nation, and framed around 
a ‘questions and milestones’ model that would introduce students to over-riding themes and 
key events. At this stage, Australia had no equivalent of a textbook culture in teaching history, 
or of a public examinations system which fundamentally determined students’ future chances. 
What should be included in such a prescriptive curriculum model became the vital question. 
But context as well as content provided a crucial element in this exercise.
Pedagogy – how to teach, and with what objectives – is inseparable from what to teach 
in these discussions, and must remain so in all reflections on the History Wars and their 
equivalents. What kind of future citizen, or capacities for citizenship, should a compulsory 
course in Australian history, proposed for Years 3-10, (8-9 years old to 15-16 years old), seek to 
foster? The question was framed by a widespread perception of serious weaknesses in the then 
prevailing model of including history, along with geography and economics, within variations 
(19)  P.H. Pigott et al, Museums in Australia 1975, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1975, pp.70-81.
(20)  Mathew Trinca, ‘History in Museums’ in Ashton and Clark, eds., Australian History Now, p.138.
(21)  Quoted in Taylor, ‘Under Siege from Right and Left’, p.35. 
96 パブリック・ヒストリー
of a Studies of Society and Environment (SOSE) model in most Australian schools. Premised 
on (in the Queensland example) helping ‘students understand how particular social, cultural, 
economic and environmental events from throughout history define peoples’ life experiences’, 
SOSE was seen to lack inherent intellectual challenge, methods, or skills development. Its 
origins, in a more progressive, inclusive, reflective and experiential approach to education from 
the late 1980s, seemed out of alignment with a pace of social change and skill development 
simply too rapid to be comprehended at such self-generated inquiry- and problem-based levels. 
It was also seen to have generated a cycle in which specific disciplinary training and expertise in 
teachers was undervalued; teachers with no such training were allocated to SOSE classes on the 
basis that ‘anyone can understand history’ as general knowledge; and students saw the deficit 
and judged the area accordingly. The status of, respect accorded to, and standards prevailing in, 
history in schools was seen to have steadily declined as a result. In South Australia between 1993 
and 1998, the number of final-year secondary students taking history dropped from 37 to 21 
per cent; in Tasmania in the same period the figures were from 20 to 13 per cent. In New South 
Wales, which resisted SOSE, the fall of history still seem contagious. Student numbers there 
dropped in those five years from 36 to 31 per cent.(22)
On the one hand, then, there were reasons to welcome a campaign to return history as a 
discipline – if via the medium of Australian history – to a central place in primary and secondary 
education. On the other, how resourced were schools to teach it? And if a prescriptive, nationalist 
‘facts you need to know’ approach was at the core of a compulsory curriculum, how effectively 
would it address the sagging fortunes of the discipline overall? Even the educationalist drawn 
in to advise the government on the curriculum, Tony Taylor, expressed concern that a ‘self-
serving monoculturalism’ would be the outcome, in place of ‘critical, reflective, reflexive and 
multi-perspectival’ understanding.(23) A period of intense wrangling ensued. The Australian 
Historical Association – the body representing the nation’s professional historians (whether in 
universities, government, museums or consultancy) – was prepared to endorse a curriculum 
focussed on Australian history so long as it was globally contextualised, and not to the exclusion 
of a full range of other options for the study of history in schools. The government’s attempt 
to strike a balance in content, pedagogy, resources and politics led to the hasty preparation of 
a ‘Guide to the Teaching of Australian History in Years 9 and 10’ (to which I contributed) in 
the months leading up to the federal election of 2007. This patchwork document did little 
to clarify issues before the Howard government fell. And soon after, Anna Clark published 
History’s Children, drawing on a nation-wide survey of secondary school students and teachers 
that showed a profound disaffection among them with Australian history in particular. As one 
Western Australian schoolboy put it:
(22)  Taylor, ‘Under Siege’, pp.33-35.
(23)  Tony Taylor and Robert Guyver, ‘Introduction’, in Taylor and Guyver, eds., History Wars, p.xii 
97Age of Anxiety
I feel like the history of Australia is relevant but I get the feeling that all through high 
school there’s this massive push to be a patriot and to be involved and to understand about 
Australia. But I think it’s one of the most boring countries in the world.(24)
From late 2007, incoming Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, vowed to kick-start a wide range 
of agendas that had stalled under Howard. Most symbolic was his national apology to the 
generations of Aboriginal parents and children who had been separated from each under a range 
of government policies. That apology, famously, had been withheld by Howard on the grounds 
that present governments could not be held accountable for the actions of others in history. 
Significantly, however, Rudd called a ‘truce’ rather than an end to the ‘history wars’, characterising 
the division as one between ‘a straight narrative history that brooks no contradictions, and an 
extreme relativism that is only about interpretation and not about events’.(25) This polarization 
of both sides reflected a view that an important middle ground still needed to be defined and 
held. Rudd, and his education minister, Julia Gillard, were determined to expand the concept 
of a national curriculum beyond history to encompass the entire school syllabus, responding to 
perceived deficiencies in the secondary education system overall. Together, they commenced an 
unprecedented centralisation of control over education, proposing a comprehensive national 
curriculum, national testing, national teacher registration and teacher standards. Measurement 
against these standards was to be directly linked to the provision of public funds. Their focus 
was not simply deficiencies in citizenship, but the necessity to make more fundamental progress 
in developing those capacities with which Australia could negotiate the dialectic between 
globalization and nation, and to address threats to the nation arising from fragmentation, 
disparity and discontent.(26) 
In 2008 the ‘Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians’ – agreed 
to by the Commonwealth and all state governments – began:
In the 21st century Australia’s capacity to provide a high quality of life for all will depend on 
the ability to compete in the global economy on knowledge and innovation. Education 
equips young people with the knowledge, understanding, skills and values to take advantage 
of opportunity and to face the challenge of this era with confidence.
The document continued:
Schools play a vital role in promoting the intellectual, physical, social, emotional, moral, 
spiritual and aesthetic development of young Australians, and in ensuring the nation’s 
(24)  Anna Clark, History’s Children: History Wars in the Classroom, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2009,  p.1.
(25)  ABC News transcript, 28 August 2009.
(26)  Terri Seddon, ‘National Curriculum in Australia? A matter of politics, powerful knowledge and the regulation of learning’, 
Pedagogy, Culture and Society, vol.9, no.3, 2001, p.319.
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ongoing prosperity and social cohesion.(27)
This language in itself indicates the framework for this next phase of curriculum decisions, 
including those relating to history. It also, with a remarkably bold instrumentalism, articulates 
the terms in which an historical perspective might inform these priorities of ‘prosperity’, 
‘cohesion’ and global awareness. As Terri Seddon has argued, Australia’s national curriculum 
in itself becomes ‘a kind of commodity to be desired, worked for and consumed’ in the 
new millennium’s identity politics of ‘global citizenship’. It is a range of ‘users’ – parents, 
governments, industry – which make the fundamental ‘choices’ about what should be included 
into a curriculum that is ‘delivered’ by teachers to students.(28) 
Currently, versions of the national curriculum are being developed across all areas of 
primary and secondary school education in Australia, from Year 1 (6-7 year olds) to Year 12 (17-
18 year olds), although at different rates. The curricula in English, History, Mathematics (to Year 
10) and Science (to Year 10) are in ‘implementation’ phases; Arts, Physical Education, Civics 
and Citizenship, Economics and Business, Languages, Geography and Technologies are among 
those still in ‘writing’ phases. 
Of its nature, a national curriculum sets uniform standards, processes and measures. The 
body established to oversee this process, the Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting 
Authority (ACARA) is clear on this point:
[The National Curriculum] makes clear what all young Australians should learn as they 
progress through schooling. It is the foundation for high quality teaching to meet the needs 
of all Australian students.
Critics are already questioning how effectively these goals are being met. Australia does well in 
international benchmarking, scoring relatively high educational ‘outcomes’. But it does less well 
in dealing with educational inequality, in achieving that genuine inclusiveness in schools which 
often needs to be tackled at local levels, in the diagnosis of learning difficulties and adaptations 
of curriculum to needs and circumstances. The focus on developing the content and systems of 
each discipline in a uniform curriculum can seem to be at the cost of adaptability and resources 
in how it is taught. Experience of such processes elsewhere – including of performance-
measurement systems, tied to funding – indicates that they have particularly adverse impacts 
on teaching in less advantaged classrooms, and ‘stop teachers from generating transformative 
pedagogies which could make a difference’.(29) 
(27)  Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians (Ministerial Council on Education, Training and Youth 
Affairs), 2008, p.4.
(28)  Terri Seddon, ‘National Curriculum in Australia? A matter of politics, powerful knowledge and the regulation of learning’, 
Pedagogy, Culture and Society, vol.9, no.3, 2001, pp.307, 319-20, 326.
(29)  Bill Atweh and Parlo Singh, ‘The Australian curriculum: continuing the conversation’, Australian Journal of Education, 
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The National Curriculum has three priorities across all areas: Australia and Asian 
engagement; sustainability; and awareness of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander histories and 
cultures. The availability of teachers with a background in ‘Asian engagement’ – particularly if 
it is assumed to have some language component – is minimal, and declining. Ironically, it has 
also been observed that prescriptive curriculum driven methods, when applied to schools in 
remote Aboriginal communities in Australia, result in a ‘differential provision’ of content, based 
on a self-fulfulling judgment of what students can comprehend and what employment options 
are open to them. Real differences are only made in the education of these most chronically 
disadvantaged students when teachers have flexibility in framing their studies and no judgments 
are made, or implied, about how the student might seek to participate in ‘the global economy’, 
that ‘economy’ in itself being a subject of careful, culturally-nuanced appraisal. Argueably, 
the same generalised attention to impacts rather than local opportunities accounted for the 
disengagement Alison Clark found among most school students from questions of Aboriginal 
or environmental history.(30)
Nonetheless, the market is now open for textbooks to serve the History curriculum – 
publishers are jockeying for access, consultants are busy, but Australia’s state governments, 
which will have ultimate control over what is taught in their schools, remain non-committal 
about the resources they will make available. One offering, from Cambridge University Press, 
was published earlier this year, in four handsome, well-designed and produced textbooks 
which are designed to directly guide classroom practice. These texts were prepared by panels 
of academic and secondary school teachers of history, drawn from around Australia, with the 
objective of enabling ‘students and teachers across the nation to work on the same topics and 
themes, placing their own local stories in national and global contexts’. In her foreword to each 
volume, Angela Woollacott states:
We understand the importance of Aboriginal history, and we now expect to learn about the 
historical experiences of Australians’ families and ancestors who arrived here from various 
regions of the world. People who have made history include peasants and kings, ancient 
Egyptians and ancient Australians, women and men, and people from a wide range of 
cultures, traditions and linguistics backgrounds. 
As that formulation implies, the national curriculum is addressed to students in the context 
of contemporary issues, national transitions, and global dynamics. Woollacott continues: ‘The 
Australian Curriculum: History is innovative in its balance between world history and Australian 
history, and in placing Australian history in the context of Asian and Pacific histories, for 
vol.55, no.3, 2011, pp.4-10.
(30)  Robyn Hewitson, ‘Restoring Curriculum Engagement’, Curriculum Centre Stage (Australian Curriculum Studies Associa-
tion), 2007,  pp.316-7.
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example, as well as European, American and other histories.’(31)
The guiding themes in each volume are constant, although their sophistication increases 
with each school year. For Year 8 (13-14 year olds), they are:
Understanding change and continuity
Building an historical vocabulary
Analysing primary and secondary sources (later years are introduced to the concept of 
‘synthesising sources’ and evaluating ‘online’ materials)
Identifying perspectives in sources
Writing skills (later including ‘persuasive writing’)
Speaking skills
The focus for Year 8 is: ‘The ancient to the modern world (650-1750)’. The first question posed 
in this, as in each volume, is ‘Why is this relevant?’ to which the answer is given: 
Studying the rise and fall of these civilizations helps us to understand changes in the world 
today, such as the growing importance of the Asian powers. Learning about the spread of 
Christianity and Islam, and their interactions both through peaceful and violent conflict, 
gives us insight into the relations between Muslims and Christianity today’.(32) 
Historical knowledge, then, is explicitly placed in relation to contemporary interests. So, for 
example, Year 8 are introduced to Japan via ‘Japan under the Shoguns 794-1867’, the rationale 
being given as: 
Japan is once again a world power, adapting to international influences while retaining 
essential aspects of its national identity that have a powerful impact in the wider world.
The central question students are asked is: ‘Which significant Japanese people, groups and ideas 
from this period have influenced the world today?’(33) 
There is no specific Australian content for Year 8. They had some in Year 7, in the context 
of ‘The Ancient World’, its relevance being: ‘The evolution of our shared ancestors in Africa, 
and how and where early civilisations developed, are key parts of a long and fascinating history 
from which we can learn about managing our environment’.(34) They get much more in Year 10, 
which covers ‘The modern world and Australia 1918-present’ and focuses on the environmental 
(31)   Angela Woollacott, Foreword, in Woollacott, ed., History 8 for the Australian Curriculum, Melbourne: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013, p.vi.
(32)  History 8, p.17.
(33)  History 8, p.231.
(34)  Angela Woollacott, ed., History 7 for the Australian Curriculum, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p.21.
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challenges of technological and economic developments; anti-colonialism; migration; and the 
rise of social movements and ‘rights and freedoms’. In that year, students deal extensively with 
Nazi Germany, the holocaust, political leadership and propaganda. ‘Key individuals’ identified 
for close study in this segment are: Goering, Hess, Goebbels, Speer, Heydrich and Riefenstahl. 
There is no equivalent coverage of the political and cultural context of Japan’s entry into World 
War II, and while Hideki Tojo and Isoroku Yamamoto noted as ‘key people’, there is no other 
mention of them in the text. It is, perhaps, significant in the context of the curriculum’s general 
focus on Australia’s ‘place in Asia’ that the Pacific War is comparatively lightly covered. Like all 
national curricula, present relationships are managed and placed in perspective here.
This brief sample will have to suffice – but there is perhaps enough here to suggest the 
approach taken. The History curriculum is impressive in forging links between past and present 
that are not forced, that do not play to simplistic ‘compare and contrast’ treatments, and engage 
students with questions of disciplinary method and perspectives. In discussing Australia’s 
post-war immigration program, for example, students are invited to undertake a role play: 
one group to write a letter from recently arrived immigrant home to her family; another to 
compose a report by an immigration official to his supervisor on the difficulties of processing 
and accommodating immigrants.(35) Social, political, cultural, environmental, technological and 
economic histories are woven through the syllabus. And national history is placed thoughtfully 
in the context of global dynamics. There is, no doubt, a question to be asked about the extent 
to which a curriculum so explicitly framed around current ‘relevance’ can adapt to change 
in contemporary circumstances, and also about the assumptions on which it is built. There 
is, for example, a striking congruence between the view of the world to be presented in 
Australian schools through this curricula – and the place in it of Australian citizens as dynamic, 
cosmopolitan citizens – and the focus of Australia in the Asian Century on developing a new 
congruence between Australia and the rising middle classes of Asia. This focus on Australia’s 
search for a ‘place’ amid change might not be the same as others’ perceptions of obstacles to it.
This is my assessment – that at least this version of the national curriculum in history, 
whatever reservations there might be about the larger project, has advanced considerably 
beyond the ‘history wars’ of ten years ago, and beyond the ‘massive push to be a patriot’ that 
deterred students of Australian history. But this is a view not universally shared. In the lead-up 
to Australia’s most recent federal election, which saw the return of a Liberal government led 
by Tony Abott, it was clear this particular curricula was in their sights. Early in the campaign 
Abbott spoke of the need to ‘rethink’ the history curriculum, which had become ‘politicised’.(36) 
The incoming minister for education, Christopher Pyne, backed his leader, stating that the 
issue was as much one of standards as politics, but on both counts the curriculum was flawed. 
(35)  Angela Woollacott, ed., History 10 for the Australian Curriculum, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p.274
(36)  ‘Time to re-think history’, Australian, 3 September 2013
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There was no balance in what students were being asked to study.(37) Too much Asia, not enough 
Australia; too much environment, not enough progress; too much change, not enough heritage. 
Social commentators have rallied to theme: the overarching themes of Asian engagement, 
sustainability and indigenous perspectives, were impositions on students who had yet to get the 
‘fundamental building blocks’ of basic skills and concepts.(38) 
It is hard to imagine that the momentum in developing such resources will simply come 
to a halt, and the process start all over again. It is backed, more than the Howard initiative ever 
was, by a solid investment in providing teaching resources and disciplinary reflection as well as 
content and an overall policy priority for boosting education as a national resource. But – if 
only for the enduring politics of the issues: of national history, pedagogy and citizenship – it 
will come under close scrutiny. Its case has probably not been helped by a title page graphic for 
one volume which shows a group of citizens in silhouette, centring on a child holding a placard 
‘Sorry’ – all with their backs to us except a young, post-war immigrant (wearing the cap of the 
European refugee and with suitcase) and a young Aboriginal dancer, adorned with traditional 
body paint.
IV. Current historical scholarship
This rising debate over the History curriculum indicates that causes for anxiety have not 
disappeared – certainly not in terms of the public role attributed to Australian history. But 
how does this relate to the ‘state of the discipline’ as practiced? Mark McKenna concludes his 
chapter in the Cambridge History noting that a ‘hesitant and uneasy’ state continues in historical 
practice in Australia. That condition, he suggests, reflects still unsettled questions arising from 
the colonial past and compounded by environmental impacts on the land itself, but also by 
the tension between a professional historical practice that seeks distance from the past, as a 
subject to be comprehended in its difference, and more popular forms of practice which seek 
to be present in the past, and work with ‘the language of immediacy, spectacle, recreation’.(39) 
Negotiating between these points is not only a choice between the professional and the popular, 
but of dealing with a more pervasive ‘democratisation of historical writing’ identified by Dipesh 
Chakrabarty: a longer term process in which the inclusiveness sought by social history has 
expanded to accommodate the politics of recognition, representation and authenticity. In 
this trajectory, as Chakrabarty warns, history’s role in the assertion of an ‘identity’ to which 
subjects have an inherent or compensatory right overwhelms its older claim to understand such 
identities in terms of struggle, ideology, power, conflict or destiny.(40) Chakrabarty’s comments 
(37)  Pyne puts focus on standards’, Australian, 28 September 2013
(38)  Judith Sloan, ‘National Curriculum Mired by Half-Baked Fads’, Australian, 12 October 2013.
(39)  McKenna, ‘Anxiety’, pp.579-80.
(40)  Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘Reconciliation and Its Historiography” Some Preliminary Thoughts’, UTS Review, vol.7, no.3, 2001, 
p.68.
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have a general, disciplinary field of reference. But they were also prompted by the ways in 
which the Aboriginal reconciliation movement, and the impact of the personal testimonies 
of ‘stolen generations’ of Aboriginal children, has rendered the concept of Aboriginal identity 
in Australian history unproblematic in itself, something to be recovered from history rather 
than something seen as enmeshed in history. This assumption, whatever its political power, 
Chakrabarty cautions, might not necessarily be good historical practice. It might, in fact, only 
serve to dull the longer term theoretical and political evolution of the discipline.
There is not scope here for any effective survey of current historical scholarship in Australia. 
But the issue Chakrabarty raises – as a practitioner of Indian subaltern history who currently 
moves between academic positions in the United States and Australia – has a central place in my 
argument here. Australian history has sought to accommodate a diversity of different voices over 
recent decades, beginning with voices of class and gender, moving on to those of ethnicity, race, 
sexuality and environmental attachment, and most recently those of transnational experience 
and mobility. It has, undoubtedly, become a more inclusive historiography as a result. But in 
terms of its nagging ‘anxiety’ – or ‘anxieties’ – to what extent has it addressed those two core 
problems identified at the outset of this paper? First, McKenna’s sense of the unresolved quest 
for/preoccupation with a ‘foundational narrative’. Second, a desire to retain a capacity to speak 
directly to the nation rather than to offer an account of the nation – one that might, of necessity, 
be challenging, taxing, multi-perspectival, comparative, or driven by questions of a theoretical 
kind? To ‘question’, as Atkinson puts it, rather than ‘entertain’? 
My point is not there has been any dumbing-down in Australian history: these two 
elements of anxiety reflect an earnestness of purpose rather than a derogation of duty. As Bain 
Attwood has argued, the ‘empathy’ that has driven the inclusiveness of Australian history (in 
his case, in Aboriginal history especially) has had the benefit of reclaiming a sense of authentic 
experience, but might also have had the effect of distracting attention from issues of historical 
change, causation and contextualization, and minimized the ‘distancing’ of the subject that is 
central to the power of historical knowledge in actively explaining the specific conditions of 
difference between past and present.(41) Revealingly, the students Anna Clark surveyed were 
most antithetical to Aboriginal history as a component of Australian history not because of 
their racism but because there was so little ‘distance’ created between the contemporary politics 
of a national response to violence dispossession and an historical engagement with the dynamic 
contexts of colonization and resistance.(42) What ‘we’ did to ‘them’ was no way to generate 
historical interest. 
Australian history, for all its diversity, has still got a way to go in breaking that ‘we’ into 
meaningful historical components. What Ghassan Hage terms ‘white multiculturalism’ 
(41)  Bain Attwood, ‘In the Age of Testimony: The Stolen Generations Narrative, “Distance” and Public History’, Public Culture, 
vol.20, no.1, 2008, pp.92-4.
(42)  Clark, History’s Children, pp.70-72.
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still prevails, for example, in much of the history of immigration – and will, perhaps, until 
immigrants themselves move from memoire and autobiography to write histories.(43) But 
even then, the histories they write will perhaps not be histories of immigration to Australia – 
national histories of immigration - but histories of mobility, disruption, opportunity, choice 
and no-choice that are not defined by national borders. The same is true of the rising interest 
in transnational history, which has had the benefit of breaking down Australian stereotypes 
of ‘here’ and ‘elsewhere’ but is still mainly concerned with ‘us’ going to ‘them’. And to the 
extent that Australian history (and the national curriculum) seems to follow the imperatives of 
Australian policy, it is arguable whether Australia in the Asian Century gets to the heart of what 
is really changing in the region, which is possibly a good deal more than the consumer choices 
of a generic middle class (what ‘we’ can sell to ‘them’). If history is to relevant to the world we 
live, it will need to change; if it is to be relevant to the world of information through which we 
increasingly gain that experience, it will probably need to change more.
In terms of anxiety, however, and the aftermath of the History Wars, I am currently dealing 
with a problem. I have a part-time position in the Research Centre at the National Museum of 
Australia, where my role includes offering advice on the relevant historiography, and historical 
debates, relating to exhibition proposals. In 2015, the NMA will be expected to mount an 
exhibition on Australia’s entry into World War I with the botched beach landing of ANZAC 
troops on the beaches of Gallipoli, Turkey, on 25 April. This, in terms of heritage, was where 
the young Australian nation ‘proved itself in a baptism of fire’. The date of that landing became 
ANZAC Day, which is observed with increasing solemnity across Australia as our one, true 
national day – in part because the events it commemorates inscribed Australia into a history other 
than our own. ANZAC Day was also at the core of Howard’s sense of a history to celebrate (and 
not of Keating’s vision: he preferred Kokoda to Gallipoli – in Papua New Guinea, Keating said, 
we were fighting for ourselves, not Empire). But what new can be said about ANZAC Day, and 
what new about World War I – especially in a social history museum, that seeks to recapture the 
immediacy of historical experience? As often, the national curriculum in History is remarkably 
advanced in its suggestions. Drawing on a good deal of recent historical scholarship, it deals 
with World War I in Year 9, beginning with militarization themes but them subtly evolving to 
a more interrogative mode: ‘If we shift the focus away from the flag-waving crowds and look 
across the entire nation, what do we see?’ Students are encouraged to debate positions, to take 
the role of – for example – ‘a pro-war loyalist, a pacifist, a eugenicist, a socialist, a wounded 
soldier, a grieving parent’. They are invited to empathize with a range of different views, to 
consider ethnic, class, religious and social divisions, to consider what returned soldiers might 
have found difficult, to reflect on the forms that grief might have taken. They are asked to live 




through a war of increasing horror, not to see it retrospectively as a test of courage and sacrifice. 
They are even invited to debate whether ‘ANZAC Day was as much a political creation [of 
conservative political forces in the 1920s] rather than a spontaneous people’s event’. But these, 
we know already, are not the new government’s view. Already it speaks of ‘celebrating’ rather 
than ‘commemorating’ ANZAC. And it is not the view many people have in the community. 
World War I is prime ‘cult of memory’ territory, with as many (white, non-recent immigrant) 
Australians as possible seeking to find an ancestor’s name on an honour roll, or in a war grave, 
or lost in action list. Bruised once in the past, the NMA is wondering how far it can go now 
in bringing an increasingly complex historiography into an increasingly narrow field of public 
investment in history. The answer is far from simple.
